In less than three years, the Western withdrawal from the Sahel has redrawn the security map of a strategic region. Russian private military actors, an autonomist regional bloc, and new partnerships with Turkey and Iran have replaced the architecture in place since the 2010s. Companies operating in or exposed to the region now face a different set of operating rules. This analysis sets out the dynamics in motion and their concrete operational implications.
The withdrawal timeline and its immediate consequences
The sequence is well known but its cumulative effects deserve restating. France completed its withdrawal from Mali in August 2022 and from Niger in December 2023. The United Nations peacekeeping mission MINUSMA left Mali at the end of 2023. Burkina Faso requested the departure of French forces in early 2023. US forces — including roughly 1,000 personnel and a $100 million drone base in Niger — completed their withdrawal in mid-September 2024.
In each case, the military juntas in power justified the decision by pointing to the relative failure of Western security partnerships to contain the jihadist threat. Whatever the merits of that judgment, the operational result is unambiguous: a security vacuum that several actors are now rushing to fill.
The Alliance of Sahel States: emergence of an autonomist bloc
On 16 September 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger announced the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), initially conceived as a mutual-defence pact. The alliance represents a deliberate break with the regional security architectures backed by Western powers.
In January 2025, the three countries formally exited ECOWAS, accusing the regional bloc of having "lost its way" and of serving as an instrument of foreign powers. In December 2025, they took a decisive step by establishing a Unified Force (FU-AES) of approximately 5,000 troops, presented as the joint military instrument to fight terrorism and secure borders.
The statement made by General Omar Tchiani, who leads Niger's military government, at the FU-AES founding summit captures the political posture: "The AES has put an end to all occupying forces on our territories. No nation or interest group will dictate terms to our countries any longer."
This political line is accompanied by structural transformations: a planned common currency, an AES passport in circulation since 2025, diplomatic alignment with Russia, Iran and Turkey, and the marginalisation of traditional European cooperation channels.
Russian private military companies: from Wagner Group to Africa Corps
At the centre of the Russian strategy in the Sahel is the deployment of quasi-private military companies operating as the armed extension of Russian influence. The Wagner model promised unconditional security assistance — protecting military elites from internal opposition and international pressure — in exchange for access to natural resources and diplomatic alignment.
Public reporting on the Malian contract indicates monthly payments of approximately $10 million to maintain 1,000 Wagner troops and their operations. Far from reducing violence, Wagner operations frequently intensified conflict dynamics, exacerbated human rights violations, and weakened local governance — as documented by multiple international organisations.
Following Yevgeny Prigozhin's death in August 2023 and the operational dissolution of Wagner, the Africa Corps, newly formed by the Russian Ministry of Defence, has taken over these missions. The difference matters: where Wagner maintained an appearance of autonomy, Africa Corps is explicitly integrated into the Russian state apparatus, under direct GRU (military intelligence) supervision. The implications for Western companies are significant — any incident involving Africa Corps now constitutes sovereign rather than mercenary exposure.
Concrete implications for businesses operating in or exposed to the region
The fragmented security environment of the Sahel creates challenges that go well beyond physical risk management. Jihadist attacks have reached record levels two years after the departure of Western forces, with the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) as the most active actors. Five strategic considerations are now imposing themselves on business operators.
1. Complete reconfiguration of local partnerships. Relationships with authorities are now mediated by new foreign actors — Russian, Turkish, Iranian — whose interests often diverge sharply from those of traditional Western partners. An updated mapping of local allegiances is now essential before any negotiation.
2. Heightened operational volatility. The absence of proven security mechanisms means situations can deteriorate within hours. Emergency and evacuation plans designed before 2022 are largely obsolete and need to be rebuilt from the ground up.
3. Obsolescence of standard databases. Commercial risk-intelligence tools struggle to reflect a reality whose configurations change faster than their update cycles. Field-based human intelligence, with reliable and triangulated local sources, has once again become the only operationally useful mode of knowledge.
4. Concentration of risk in specific sectors. Extractive industries — gold, uranium, lithium, cobalt — and critical infrastructure operators face exceptional risk. These assets are priority targets for jihadist groups seeking financing, and for new state-linked security actors seeking strategic control.
5. Exposure to secondary sanctions. The presence of Africa Corps at certain sites creates real exposure to OFAC and EU sanctions regimes. In-depth diligence on the precise composition of the security arrangement at any operating site is now essential to prevent inadvertent contamination.
What will not return
There is currently no credible path to restoration of the previous security architecture. Western countries have refocused their attention on the Gulf of Guinea coastal states (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Benin, Togo), whose stabilisation has become the new shared priority. Sahelian juntas, for their part, are deepening ties with Russia but also with Iran — which signed several security cooperation agreements with Bamako in 2025 — and Turkey (Bayraktar drones and military training).
Jihadist groups are exploiting the vacuum. The relative failure of new partnerships to contain the terrorist threat — despite initial promises — suggests instability will persist over the medium term. For companies, the risk-return calculus has fundamentally shifted. The region remains rich in economic opportunities, particularly in strategic minerals tied to the energy transition. But access to these opportunities now requires advisory and security partners capable of navigating an environment in which the old reference points have disappeared.
Recommendations for business operators
Seven actions to adapt your Sahelian posture to the 2026 landscape:
- Rebuild country-risk evaluation on continuously updated field-based sources, not on standard commercial databases.
- Map the new security actors present at each operating site, with precise identification of command structures and contractual chains.
- Completely rebuild emergency and evacuation plans, accounting for the progressive closure of traditional air and ground corridors.
- Audit local partners against new political allegiances and secondary-sanctions risks.
- Establish dedicated intelligence monitoring with update cycles aligned to the speed at which local configurations shift.
- Strengthen training of expatriate and local teams on new threat signatures, particularly cyber and insider threats.
- Evaluate the case for geographic repositioning toward ECOWAS coastal states, balancing risk exposure against access to strategic resources.
Frequently asked questions
Which countries form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)? The AES brings together Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, three countries governed by military juntas that came to power through coups d'état between 2020 and 2023. Established in September 2023, the alliance formally exited ECOWAS in January 2025.
Which Russian actor has replaced the Wagner Group in the Sahel? Following Wagner's near-dissolution in 2023, the Africa Corps — placed under direct supervision of the Russian Ministry of Defence — has taken over its missions in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
Why are standard country-risk databases inadequate for the Sahel? Commercial intelligence databases rely on public sources with update cycles of several weeks to several months. In an environment where security configurations shift in days and where informal actors play a decisive role, only field-based human intelligence provides operationally reliable insight.
Should Western companies withdraw from the Sahel? Not systematically. The decision depends on sector exposure, operational footprint, the profile of local partners, and available insurance coverage. A case-by-case evaluation often allows companies to maintain operations with redesigned security arrangements.
Which sectors face the highest risk in the Sahel? Extractive industries (gold, uranium, lithium), critical infrastructure operators (energy, telecoms, transport), and NGOs working in remote areas concentrate the highest risk.
How can a local partner's reliability be assessed in the Sahel in 2026? Through field-based due diligence combining administrative checks, human intelligence on the partner's network, analysis of political and military ties, and mapping of potential conflicts of interest with new foreign actors present in the country.
COMYA Group supports business operators exposed to the Sahel through field-based strategic intelligence assignments, risk audits, and crisis management. For a confidential consultation, contact our team.
About the author: Alexandre Benalla is the founder of COMYA Group, a Swiss advisory firm specialising in security, strategic intelligence and crisis management. He has worked for over a decade on complex African, European and Middle-Eastern theatres.